Abstract. In previous studies of spatial public goods game, each player is able to establish a group. However, in real life, some players cannot successfully organize groups for various reasons. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of reputation-driven group formation, in which groups can only be organized by players whose reputation reaches or exceeds a threshold. We define a player's reputation as the frequency of cooperation in the last T time steps. We find that the highest cooperation level can be obtained when groups are only established by pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last T time steps. Effects of the memory length T on cooperation are also studied.
reasons. Very recently, Szolnoki and Chen proposed a model where only those players whose previous payoff exceeds a threshold level can establish a PGG group [32] . They demonstrated that a carefully chosen threshold to establish PGG group could efficiently improve the cooperation level.
Motivated by the pioneering work of Szolnoki and Chen, in this paper we propose a reputation-driven group formation mechanism where PGG groups are organized by players whose reputation reaches or exceeds a threshold. A player's reputation is defined as the frequency of cooperation in the past few time steps. We find that cooperation can be greatly promoted when PGG groups are established by high-reputation players.
Model
Our model is described as follows.
Players are located on a L × L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Each PGG group is composed of a focal player and its four neighbors. Thus the size of each PGG group is five. A player i may participate in five different PGG groups orginized by i and its four neighbors respectively.
At each time step, every cooperator contributes a unit cost to each involved PGG group. Defectors invest nothing. The total cost of a group is multiplied by a factor, and is then redistributed uniformly to all the five players in this group. We denote i's strategy at time t as s i (t) = 1 for cooperation and s i (t) = 0 for defection. At time t, the payoff that player i gains from the group organized by player j is
where x = 0 stands for player j, x > 0 represent the neighbors of j and r is the multiplication factor. The total payoff of the player i at t is calculated by
where Ω i denotes the community of neighbors of i and itself, ∆ j (t) = 1 if player j's reputation R j (t) reaches or exceeds a threshold H otherwise ∆ j (t) = 0. The reputation of a player i at time t is defined as the frequency of cooperation in the last T time steps, that is
We set R i (0) = 1 so that initially (t = 0) all players can organized PGG groups. When the reputation threshold H = 0, our model is reverted to the original model in which players can organized PGG groups all the time. Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly distributed with the equal probability 0.5. After each time step, all individuals synchronously update their strategies as follows. Each individual i randomly chooses a neighbor j and adopts the neighbor j's strategy with the probability: where K characterizes the noise introduced to permit irrational choices [33] .
Main results and Analysis
We assume that players occupy nodes on a 100×100 square lattice and the noise K = 0.5. Players can be divided into four types: C s (D s ) denotes cooperators (defectors) who successfully organize PGG groups, and C f (D f ) denotes cooperators (defectors) who fail to organize PGG groups. The key quantity for characterizing the cooperative behavior of the system is the fraction of cooperators (including C s and C f ) ρ c in the steady state. In all simulations below, ρ c is obtained by averaging over the last 5,000 time steps of the entire 50,000 time steps. Each data is obtained by averaging over 50 different realizations. Figure 1 shows the fraction of cooperators ρ c as a function of the multiplication factor r for different values of the reputation threshold H. From Fig. 1 , we can see that for any given value of H, ρ c increases from 0 to 1 as r increases. In Fig. 2 , we plot the full r − H phase diagram for the memory length T = 5. There are regions: full cooperators (C), full defectors (D), and the coexistence of cooperators and defectors (C + D). One can find that the region of C + D phase becomes very narrow as the reputation threshold H increases. This phenomenon indicates that the phase transition from full D to the coexistence of C + D is discontinuous when H and T is very large. For fixed values of the multiplication factor r and the memory length T , ρ c increases with H, indicating that cooperation is best promoted when PGG groups can only be organized by pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last T time steps. Since some groups may not be organized, it is necessary for us to investigate whether higher cooperation level brings higher payoff. Figure 4 shows the average payoff of players P in the steady state as a function of the reputation threshold H for different values of the multiplication factor r. One can see that for each value of r, P increases with H, manifesting that the average payoff is positively related with the cooperation the high reputation threshold, only a very small fraction of D s players can dispersedly survive during the whole evolution. It is noted that during the evolution, C s clusters are surrounded by C f players. These C f players act as protective layers which can effectively prevent the invasion of defectors. On the one hand, defectors outside the protective layers cannot gain payoffs from C f players who fail to organize PGG groups. One the other hand, C f players can receive aid from C s players inside the protective layers by participating in PGG groups organized by C s players.
For the low reputation threshold (e.g., H = 0.2), in the beginning most of players become D s or D f players while C s players can only form tiny clusters [see Fig. 6(a) Next, we study the stationary density of the four types of players as a function of the multiplication factor r for H = 0.2 and H = 0.6 respectively. From Fig. 7 , one can see that the stationary density of D f players decreases as r increases. On the contrary, the stationary density of C s players increases with r. Both of the stationary density of C f and D s players are not a monotonic function of r. In fact, the stationary density of C f and D s players are maximized at moderate values of r. For the low reputation threshold (H = 0.2), the number of D s players is much larger than that of C f players [see Fig. 7(a) ]. For the high reputation threshold (H = 0.6), the number of D s players is almost the same as that of C f players [see Fig. 7(b) ].
Finally, we study the effects of the memory length T on cooperation. Figure 8 shows the fraction of cooperators ρ c as a function of the multiplication factor r for different values of the memory length T . From Fig. 8(a) , we can see that for a given value of r, ρ c decreases as T increases when the reputation threshold H = 0.2. However, for H = 1, the cooperation level increases with T [see Fig. 8(c) ]. For H = 0.6, the highest cooperation level is obtained when T = 2 [see Fig. 8(b) ]. In fact, we can determine the optimal value of T which leads to the highest cooperation level as follows. For i/(i + 1) < H ≤ (i + 1)/(i + 2) (i=0,1,2...), the optimal value of T (hereafter denoted by T opt ) is T opt = i + 1. For examples, T opt = 2 when 1/2 < H ≤ 2/3 and T opt = 3 when 2/3 < H ≤ 3/4 (the results for T opt = 3 are not shown here). Note that for a given value of H and the corresponding T opt , only pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last T opt time steps can organized PGG groups. Taking H = 0.6 as an example, defectors with reputation R = 2/3 still can organize groups if T = 3. However, for T = 1 or T = 2, only pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last T time steps can organized groups. According to the results in Fig. 1 , cooperation can be best enhanced if PGG groups can only be organized by pure cooperators. The criteria of pure cooperators becomes stricter as the memory length T increases. Thus, the highest cooperation level is obtained when T = 2.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we have studied the impact of reputation-driven group formation on the evolution of cooperation. We define the reputation of a player as the frequency of cooperation in the last T time steps. Here T represents a memory length. A player can organize a group only when his/her reputation reaches or exceeds a threshold H. We find that both of the cooperation level and the average payoff increase with the threshold H, manifesting that cooperation can be best promoted when groups are only organized by pure cooperators who never change strategy during the memory length. For the high threshold H, failed cooperators who cannot successfully organize groups form a protective layer around those successful cooperators. The dependence of the memory length on cooperation is found to be non-monotonic. Our results are useful for understanding the role of reputation in modern society. Leaders who want to organize a group should be of high reputation. Low reputation will destroy the stability of a group, leading to a lower cooperation level. Since individuals with high reputation usually gain high payoff, our results are consistent with that in Ref. [32] . The full-cooperator state disappears if the threshold level of payoff is too high in Ref. [32] . While in our model, the full-cooperator phase still exists when the reputation threshold is very high. Together Ref. [32] and our work provide a deeper understanding of the impact of group formation on the evolution of cooperation.
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